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The Possibility of a Phenomenology of Cultural Worlds in Hegel and Husserl 
 
It goes to Hegel’s credit to have alerted us that ethics is not just a matter of my individual 
decision – and be it in line with something as universal yet abstract as the categorical 
imperative. Rather, being ethical means for an individual to consider the world they live in. 
This world precedes the individual as a meaningful context that is determined by certain 
senses, atmospheres, and ideals. It is also a world of customs, laws, and regulations which the 
individual needs to consider. This does not mean to adhere to these customs blindly; in fact, it 
does not even mean to have to adhere to them at all if they prove faulty or outdated. Yet 
considering them is necessary since our actions are always actions in context, that is, actions 
that emerge from a context and influence this context in turn. 
 With Hegel, we can say that an ethical decision is a decision that is made after 
considering the world we live in, but needs to also involve the conscience of the individual, 
as we will see more closely. But how can we consider the world we live in? How can we get 
a sense of that world, given that we tend to take it for granted as our familiar context? That is 
where a ‘phenomenology’ of that world would be helpful, namely, a description of how this 
world comes to appear. This essay claims that the world we live in is best understood as a 
historical-cultural world. It is a historical world because world is always in a process of 
becoming and evolves historically. It is cultural because it consists of the meaningful 
connections that permeate a particular world, and these meanings make up a cultural. We will 
refer to cultural-historical worlds here just as cultural worlds because the historical character 
is already implied in the (phenomenological) concept of world whereas the cultural character 
calls for more exploration. 
 The fact that ethics requires considering one’s cultural world can be explained and 
justified on the grounds of Heidegger’s or Merleau-Ponty’s observation that our existence is 
being-in-the-world or being-toward-the-world. Yet the significance of world as well as its 
historical-cultural character have already been identified by Husserl, and for reasons that 
should emerge more fully below, Husserl proves a particularly promising philosopher for 
exploring the nature and manifestation of cultural worlds. In thinking about ethics from the 
perspective of world, a tension comes to the fore that has been treated by different 
philosophers under different headings. The phenomenological perspective in existentialist 
terms would utilize the concepts freedom versus facticity, where facticity names our being 
(thrown) in(to) the world. Quite a similar distinction with an even stronger emphasis on 
ethics is the Hegelian distinction between morality and Sittlichkeit. While morality designates 
Kantian ethics which both Husserl and Hegel find too abstract, individualistic, or lacking in 
attention to historyi, the concept of Sittlichkeit requires some explanation which will be 
provided in the first section of this essay. 
Ethics is thus an interplay of (more or less) rational decisions and habitualized laws. 
This interplay has taken different shapes during history, and at different times, one or the 
other element dominates. Husserl is usually interpreted as tending more toward the modern 
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Kantian perspective whereas Hegel is said to emphasize the necessary reconciliation of self-
consciousness and general law in which the law becomes a “second nature” to me. There is 
certainly some truth to this common interpretation; yet in the end, each of them emphasizes 
both aspects of ethics, morality as well as habitualization. Husserl’s focus on reason might let 
us forget that he also acknowledges the significance of tradition and heritage (in the widest 
sense). In reading Husserl’s Kaizo articles, I will therefore highlight a theme which at first 
does not seem central to the articles: the level of “religious culture.” 
 Yet this does not mean that a subordinate aspect will be emphasized here in order to 
move Husserl closer to Hegel. The themes of habitualization and sedimentation are 
fundamental themes of Husserl’s phenomenology. The idea of a primordial foundation of an 
ethical life on the individual and communal level compliments this emphasis. Husserl reflects 
on norms as familiar-optimal standards and on the role of the phenomenologists in perceiving 
crises and in questioning norms which are possibly no longer optimal. Although Husserl 
shares Kant’s emphasis on reason (exemplified in the titles of his critiques of pure and 
practical reason), he attends to norms as the communal aspects of ethical life in a fashion 
quite alien to Kant’s categorical imperative. This turn to an ethics of norms as “second 
nature” is a turn to premodern, ancient times, as emerges from Hegel and Husserl. 
There are similar reasons that motivate Hegel and Husserl to stress the significance of 
habitualized norms. Aside from vaguely pragmatic reasons, namely, that we could often not 
act (or would act too late) if relying on the categorical imperative, both of them notice a 
certain emptiness in Kant’s notion of reason which inspires them to turn back to the ancient 
world. For ethical questions, history carries a special significance in several respects. Husserl 
shares Hegel’s conviction that something like communal consciousness exists and that, 
particularly in the context of ethical consideration, we need to move beyond the boundaries 
of the individual. A moral philosophy which takes history seriously will undoubtedly also 
consider the habitualization of norms. This means that, in contrast to Kant’s ethics, a good 
deed can no longer be regarded as an autonomous, spontaneous beginning, but only as a 
beginning on the basis of the given -- in this case, the given laws and norms. Hegel and 
Husserl both acknowledge this fact. 
 
I. Hegel on Morality versus Sittlichkeit 
As we explore the difference between morality and Sittlichkeit, there is a puzzle in Hegel’s 
philosophy which we should be aware of and try to resolve in this section. In the 
Phenomenology, Sittlichkeit precedes morality as a level of Spirit whereas in the Philosophy 
of Right, morality precedes Sittlichkeit. Given the internal necessityii that determines 
dialectical progression for Hegel, such a reversal should not happen. Yet in order to see how 
this is not a contradiction, we need to understand both concepts better. 
On the most general level, morality refers to an individual consciousness whereas 
Sittlichkeit is always concerned with a community. Sittlichkeit relates to Sitte, custom, and 
there is no such thing as “my” custom; rather, it has to be at least the custom of a small 
community like a family (e.g., “In our family, it is customary at Christmas…”). The concept 
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of morality, in contrast, is borrowed from Kant who contrasts it with legality. Morality is 
rational and free. It corresponds to the spirit of modern times which elevates the subject to the 
level of the highest principle and does not accept any law without examining it. From the 
standpoint of morality, it is the subject’s highest right “to recognize nothing that I do not 
perceive as rational” (PhR: § 132)iii.  
 The state of morality is hence a state of diremption (Entzweiung) in which the 
individual recognizes his/her own will in contrast to and possibly in conflict with the laws of 
society. A main point of critique raised by Hegel against the standpoint of morality as 
conceived by Kant is its emptiness of content rooted in the fact that the individual gives its 
own laws. We have hence received an indication that morality, as a state of diremption, has to 
be overcome. Such overcoming happens by what Hegel designates as Sittlichkeit; yet this is 
no longer the immediate Sittlichkeit of the ancient world. The identity of individual will and 
communal customs is replaced by a relation between them, such that the individual takes over 
certain customs as a matter of conviction. This form of Sittlichkeit is realized in the European 
state.iv 
These preliminary considerations already show a certain difficulty of the relation 
between morality and Sittlichkeit. Historically speaking, Sittlichkeit both precedes and 
follows morality. The immediate form of Sittlichkeit can be found in antiquity, the mediated 
form in the European states of Hegel’s time. Hegel had not yet thought through the mediated 
form of Sittlichkeit at the time of writing the Phenomenology (– just like his state was still in 
a condition of turmoil). Superficially speaking, this is the reason why, in the Phenomenology, 
Sittlichkeit (in the shape of ancient Sittlichkeit) precedes morality, and morality then enters 
into religion,v whereas in the Philosophy of Right, Sittlichkeit follows upon morality.vi The 
earlier text focuses on ancient, immediate Sittlichkeit, the later one on mediated Sittlichkeit. 
In the Encyclopedia, Hegel provides a particularly clear definition of Sittlichkeit:  
 
When these one-sidednesses (Einseitigkeiten) have been sublated, subjective freedom as 
the universal rational will in and for itself which yields knowledge of itself in the 
consciousness of individual subjectivity and which has its state of mind as well as its 
activity and its immediate universal actuality at the same time as custom (Sitte) – self-
conscious freedom has become its nature. (Enc. III: § 513)  
 
Sittlichkeit is the sublation of a previous one-sided structure, namely, of the split between 
subjective freedom and general custom. Subjective freedom now turns into the will which is 
in and for itself; it has knowledge of itself, but it also possesses an external reality, as custom. 
Freedom has to become a form of nature as general reality while at the same time being a 
“second nature” for the individual. The individual internalizes and habitualizes the laws 
rather than making about a new decision each time (since this would delay or even prevent 
our taking action). The passage quoted here already indicates that Sittlichkeit does not mean 
to simply accept and take over existent laws and customs.vii Different levels of Sittlichkeit 
need to be distinguished, and when we have left behind the standpoint of immediate 
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Sittlichkeit, we reach a Sittlichkeit mediated by “reflection” and “insight grounded on 
reasons” (PhR: § 147).  
Although in the Phenomenology, Sittlichkeit (as ancient, immediate Sittlichkeit) 
precedes morality, the situation turns out to be more complex. The Kantian standpoint – and 
thus, in a certain sense, the standpoint of morality, although not designated as such – already 
occurs prior to Sittlichkeit, namely, at the end of the chapter on reason. Under the heading of 
reason as giving laws and reason as testing laws, Hegel criticizes contradictions in Kant’s 
theory.viii According to Hegel, reason as giving laws does not say what it really means. When 
it says, “Everyone ought to speak the truth,” it actually means “... if he knows the truth” (PhS: 
313/254). The general proposition thus acquires a specific content. 
As a result, reason cannot sustain itself; we enter into the realm of Spirit, and Spirit is 
the “actuality of Sittlichkeit” (PhS: 325/262). Immediate, harmonious Sittlichkeit as we find it 
in ancient Greece “is submerged in the formal universality of legality or law” (PhS: 326 
f./265). As shapes of diremption, Bildung and belief are opposed to each other; the 
enlightenment brings about a revolution of this opposition. The result is a return to moral 
self-consciousness and thus a return to Kant’s theory, albeit on a higher level. At stake is no 
longer the giving and testing of more or less general laws, but communal life in which the 
problem of the correlation between morality and happiness arises (PhS: 445/366). The 
postulate of the harmony between morality and happiness is problematic, since impure 
motives enter into moral consciousness. In the face of these contradictory motives, moral 
self-consciousness “flees from this with abhorrence back into itself” and turns into “pure 
conscience” (PhS: 464/383). 
The standpoint of conscience will now be treated in some detail. This examination is 
in line with my overall persuasion that the Phenomenology, due to its less rigorous 
systematicity, provides more openness for thought and more leeway for critique than the 
Philosophy of Right. 
 
II. Hegel and the Phenomenology of Conscience  
Conscience returns in a certain sense to the individual, even though we are already in the 
realm of Spirit. It will ultimately be the conversation with others which leads beyond 
conscience – after a last attempt to enter more deeply into the standpoint of conscience and 
retain it by giving equal rights to everybody when conscience turns into the beautiful soul.ix  
Conscience as “concrete moral Spirit” (PhS: 466/385) which has returned to itself is the 
immediate unity of moral essence realizing itself and action as concrete moral shape. In and 
through action, consciousness relates to the actuality. 
Conscience exists concretely as it fulfills “not this or that duty, but knows and does 
what is concretely right” (PhS: 467/385). The positive result of this repeated critique of 
Kant’s moral philosophy consists in solving the conflict of the moral world view: conscience 
does not helplessly observe the conflict of various duties, but proceeds to act. Conscience 
knows that it is in a unique or singular situation such that no casuistic approach can be 
helpful. When conscience acts, it is in a community with others. The deed is real, and it can 
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be accepted or rejected by others. More precisely, the action is real exactly because it calls for 
recognition; to act means to translate what is individual into what is universal  (PhS: 
470/388). For Hegel, the good is not the good will (which does not necessarily come to 
realize itself and thus cannot be recognized), but the good deed.  
At the same time, conscience knows very well about the difficulties of acting which 
stem from the fact that there are always some circumstances of my action that remain 
unknown to me. I am confronted with “a plurality of circumstances which breaks up and 
spreads out endlessly in all directions” (PhS: 472/389). Conscience is thus always already 
guilty since it is inevitably ignorant of at least some of the circumstances relevant to the 
action. The case of Oedipus takes this difficulty to the extreme. Since conscience cannot 
achieve complete knowledge, it takes its knowledge to be complete. Otherwise, conscience 
would never come to act. The problem of the moral world-view consists exactly in the fact 
that it is too obsessed with its own deficiencies to proceed to action. The moral world-view is 
concerned with a conflict of duties which are, upon closer consideration, devoid of content; in 
contrast, conscience imports its content, taken from its individuality, into specific duties 
(PhS: 476/393). 
Since all action stays in contact with actuality and with others, an aspect of inequality 
emerges. The action is a determinate one, “a specific action, not identical with the element of 
everyone’s self-consciousness, and therefore not necessarily acknowledged” (PhS: 477/394). 
Conscience is never merely a private judgement, but calls for general recognition. There are 
different consciences because everybody has a conscience. We do not know whether the 
other consciences are good or evil. Yet I have to take the conscience of others as evil in order 
to assert my own self, at least as an initial step (PhS: 477 f./394). 
It is necessary for us to articulate our convictions. By giving reasons, we ward off 
assumptions about bad intentions which others explicitly or implicitly attribute to us. “Here 
again, then, we see language as the existence of Spirit” (PhS: 478/395). With language, others 
truly come into play, and we are now dealing with Spirit in the genuine sense while moral 
consciousness previously remained “dumb” or silent (PhS: 479/396). Language (rather than 
action) is our true connection to the world; language eliminates alienation because it connects 
us to others and to world. Language connects one self-consciousness to the other; it is the 
possibility of communication, justification, and recognition. The role of language in Hegel is 
quite close to the significance of logos in Husserl. What we share with others is logos as 
language which allows giving reasons for our actions, i.e., giving justification (logon 
didonai). The moment of recognition is only implicitly present in Husserl; he emphasizes the 
ethical ideal we are striving for, and if this striving is successful, we will gain recognition 
from rational others. 
Although conscience seeks the recognition of others, it is initially convinced that it 
knows best what should be done, since it knows its own situation best. Others can ask for a 
justification, but from the perspective of my conscience, they owe me respect. As “moral 
genius,” conscience goes beyond the difference between abstract self-consciousness and its 
own self-consciousness, returns to itself and acquires its poorest position (PhS: 482/397). The 
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shape of the “beautiful soul” which does not want its inner beauty to be contaminated by a 
real action will not be treated in detail here, especially since Hegel also only mentions it 
briefly. x The beautiful soul lacks power because it does not come to externalize itself. “In 
this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy, so-called ‘beautiful soul’, its light dies 
away within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapour that dissolves into thin air” (PhS: 
484/400). Language thus falls into the inequality of the individual being-for-itself (an 
inequality which comes about because language, going by its meaning or essence, is meant to 
be for others). 
Yet the community in its observing role is still present, and it accuses conscience of 
hypocracy. Conscience admits that it is evil since it acts according to its law; by doing so, it 
acts against the others and “wrongs” them (PhS: 486/402). Not only the consciousness which 
gives its own law realizes that it is evil; judging consciousness has to admit that it is evil as 
well because in its judging, it shares into the evil. Acting consciousness and judging 
consciousness are two sides of one and the same coin, as it were. To judge means not to act, 
yet judging consciousness knows that acting needs to happen. Therefore, it shares the guilt. 
When judging consciousness makes itself equal to acting consciousness, it is recognized by 
acting consciousness as equal. Both recognise that they cannot be ‘objective’ because they 
cannot consider all possible aspects of the situation. Acting consciousness thus realises that it 
is not inferior to judging consciousness. Instead of trying to claim a superior position, it 
offers forgivenness to judging consciousness -- which judging consciousness does not 
immediately accept. Yet in the end, they admit that each is promoting its own self-interest 
and realize that they can forgive each other for this. Admitting their guilt opens up the 
possibility of improvement.xi 
The two forms of consciousness forgive each other, become reconciled, and recognize 
each other to be one and the same ‘I’ (PhS: 494/409). With this insight, Hegel’s 
phenomenological analysis comes to a close; and we are indeed familiar with the fact that the 
phenomenon of conscience exhibits a strangely dual nature. It determines the nature of 
conscience to carry out a dialogue within individual consciousness in which I take distance 
from myself, as it were, and assess my own intentions and actions. This is not a voluntary act 
but rather, happens to me -- almost as if an external voice was speaking to me. Conscience is 
not a solipsistic phenomenon; it is not a mere monologue. Only because we are in a 
community and conversation with others do we have conscience. Conscience necessarily 
involves the interplay of individuality and universality. One conscience by itself cannot 
decide what is good, as Husserl would agree. 
 
III. Husserl on the Renewal of Reason 
The Kaizo articles,xii written by Husserl in the years of 1922 and 1923, maintain a unique 
place within his philosophy. There, Husserl introduces certain ethical themes and problems 
which will be subsequently foregone and will resurface, albeit briefly, only at the end of his 
philosophical career (in the 1930ies). It seems justified then that these essays present 
themselves to be the key to Husserl’s phenomenological ethics. 
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 In their emphases on reason and rationality, the Kaizo articles first give an impression 
of Husserl as a Kantian, and the impression is strengthened by his discussions of the 
categorical imperative. However, a major portion of the articles and particularly Husserl’s 
reflections on religious culture appear out of place if they are read from the perspective of 
Kantian ethics. While the influence of Kant’s philosophy on Husserl’s phenomenological 
method is undoubtedly strong, this chapter will suggest that Husserl’s considerations on 
ethics rather move him away from Kant and toward Hegel.  
 Husserl’s ethical theory has not been discussed much in the literature; even less so 
have his Kaizo articles found much response, especially in the English literature.xiii Those 
authors who examine these articles either try to give an immanent interpretation without 
placing the articles in the broader context of ethical theories,xiv or come to conclude that the 
Kaizo articles are somewhat atypical for Husserl’s thought.xv I will interpret the Kaizo articles 
as a coherent account which fits well into Husserl’s late thought. For this purpose, the 
concept of reason will be examined in order to show that there are not only Kantian echoes, 
but also ancient Greek ideas which contribute to Husserl’s usage of the notion. Afterwards, 
Husserl’s investigation of norms will be considered as it moves him beyond the sphere of the 
individual. Husserl focuses on religious culture to explain the importance of habitualizing 
norms.  
Ethics, for Husserl, is the “science of the entire practical life of a rational subjectivity 
under the viewpoint of reason that regulates this life uniformly” (Hua XXVII: 21). In order to 
act in an ethical fashion, we take our orientation from an ideal, the ideal of the true and 
ethical human being. This ideal is ultimately unattainable, and yet it functions as a criterion, 
as a “pole idea” (Polidee). Husserl says that every life, even the “not completely 
consequential life of self-regulation”, qualifies as an ethical life (Hua XXVII: 39); here we 
encounter the tension between relativity and absoluteness which permeates Husserl’s 
philosophy. We thus need to investigate what reason means for Husserl and what function or 
role the ideal of the ethical human being has. 
 Husserl regards the “rationalisation of praxis” (Rationalisierung der Praxis) as an 
important task (Hua XXVII: 9); he is convinced that, along with the manifestation of reason, 
sooner or later there will be a manifestation of the good as well. This trust in the power of 
reason has its basis in the fact that rational accounts can be followed or understood. If we act 
based on reasons which we can explain to others, at least the possibility of a successful co-
existence is given. This thought already indicates that, for Husserl, reason constitutes what 
we all share. Husserl does not develop a specific philosophical concept of reason, but rather, 
leans in on our everyday understanding of rational action, acting on reasons, etc. In one of the 
few passages that explicitly lay out his concept of reason, Husserl states the following: 
 
The concept of logos as autonomous reason and originally theoretical reason, as the 
faculty of judging in a ‘self-less’ manner (‚selbstlosen’ Urteilens) which, as a 
judging from pure insight, listens exclusively to the voices of the things ‘themselves,’ 
acquires thus its original conception and simultaneously its world-changing power 
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(weltumgestaltende Kraft). (Hua XXVII: 83) 
 
Husserl thus refers us back to the Greek concept of logos. First, Aristotle famously defined 
man as the animal which has logos. As we will see, Husserl’s concern in these articles also 
lies with specific abilities which distinguish human beings from other animals -- abilities to 
face their lives, to “survey” it and to take responsibility for it. Second, one of the many facets 
of logos’ meaning is “language”; as noted above, Husserl investigates how “reasons” 
(another meaning of logos) are communicable and comprehensible. Because we have 
language, we are able to give reasons and accounts (logon didonai) for our actions.  
 However, “true knowing” in the sense of complete, infallible knowing is in principle 
unattainable for humans as finite beings. Husserl acknowledges this, yet elevates “absolute 
reason” -- in the sense of an absolutely increased theoretical and practical reason -- to the 
status of an ideal. A being with absolute reason would be God if we simultaneously attribute 
omnipotence to it (Hua XXVII: 33). The ideal thus functions as a pole, lying in infinity. “The 
absolute Limes is the idea of God;” it is “the genuine and true ego,” from which we are 
always infinitely far removed (Hua XXVII: 33 f.). 
 Before Husserl engages in considerations regarding the idea of God, he provides a 
simple argument for the existence of such an ideal that is accessible by way of the 
phenomenological method. If we criticize contemporary humanity as needing improvement, 
this judgement is based on the belief in a “good,” “true,” and “genuine” humanity as an ideal 
possibility (Hua XXVII: 10). We cannot begin our critique without imagining something 
better; and if our critique is contingent on ethical questions, the better something must be a 
better humanity. The ideal human is an “ethical human” (Hua XXVII: 23). Only in an ethical 
human being does the essence of a human being come to completion. Yet such a completely 
true, genuine, good human can only be grasped through the concept of an unattainable ideal 
which we nevertheless continuously strive for if we lead a critical life. As humans, we are 
never infallible and never reach the point where an improvement in the direction of an ethical 
ideal is no longer possible. It is because of this necessary restriction that Husserl calls the 
“not fully consequential life” ethical as well. 
The feature which forms the condition for the possibility of orienting my life in 
relation to the ideal of the good human is the fact that I can survey my life, more precisely, 
my “whole” life, or life in its entirety (Hua XXVII: 25, 31). This is a strange thought since I 
obviously do not have a standpoint at my disposal which would allow me to look at my life in 
its entirety. Perhaps this would be possible on my deathbed – but this is a retrospective 
position and signifies looking back into the past. Husserl, on the other hand, is concerned 
with striving for the future. How could a survey be possible in light of the fact that I know 
about my finitude and mortality, yet the time of my death is entirely inaccessible to me?xvi 
Considering this paradoxical situation, it is hardly surprising that Husserl, in the same 
passage in which he explicates the possibility of surveying my entire life, also talks about the 
“infinity of my life” (Hua XXVII: 27). My life is finite and infinite at once since I know about 
my death as such, but not about the “when” of this death. To put it in a less contradictory 
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fashion, I set infinite goals for myself despite my finitude; the fact that my life is limited does 
not exclude infinite responsibility, but rather, includes it. 
If these connections are kept in mind, it becomes obvious why Husserl has some 
justification to speak about a survey of our entire lives. We have an idea of our future, even if 
this idea includes a certain indeterminacy. For this future, we are able to set goals. As a 
human being, I can even set a unitary life goal for myself; at the same time, I can change this 
goal, and I may even have to change it, in accordance with the changing circumstances. And 
yet, something remains stable in this change; human beings remain true to themselves, 
wanting to love themselves, as Husserl once puts it in a manuscript.xvii This means that 
humans want to stay true to their conscience, want to act in accordance with it. The 
possibility for humans to survey their lives mean that they have conscience. It means that we 
can give account for our actions, and it also means that there is always a danger not to be able 
to “live” with a certain action. 
On the level of the community or the “human at large” (Mensch im großen), these 
definite yet changeable standards transform into norms. Norms develop over time, and it is 
thus necessary that we can communicate about them – by way of our participation in logos. 
In order to investigate the emergence and development of norms, a static procedure cannot 
suffice; a “dynamic-genetic” perspective is called for (Hua XXVII: 55).xviii Yet Husserl not 
only considers the genesis of norms in these articles, as he pursues it in the different 
manuscripts on normality. Rather, he engages in historical reflections, particularly in the 
article “Formal types of culture in the development of humanity” which constitutes the fifth 
and last essay (Hua XXVII: 59-94). These historical reflections are concerned with the 
transformation of norms over generations, on the one hand, and the different role of norms in 
antiquity, middle ages, and modernity, on the other. Parts of the investigation thus go beyond 
a genetic phenomenology and belong to a historical-generative phenomenology. 
 
IV. Husserl’s Phenomenology of Cultural Norms 
Norms possess a strange doubleness as they are “made” by us, yet at the same time, we are 
exposed and delivered over to them. This double character calls for a historical exploration. It 
might be tempting to assume that Husserl’s call for “rationalisation,” for rational critique, 
would naturally lead him to strive for a critical questioning of all norms, ruling out any 
unquestioned acceptance. This modern tendency, inspired by the spirit of enlightenment, is 
indeed prevalent in Husserl’s thought; but it is accompanied by an awareness of the value 
carried by “old and awe-inspiring tradition (altehrwürdige Tradition)” (Hua XXVII: 58). This 
tradition, although not indisputable, demands a certain respect and awe because norms have 
always been taken over by us, and this habitualization is a necessary component of ethical 
action. It is not possible for us to call the existing norms into question in every situation, 
making a critical decision every single time. Such acting would not just be impractical and 
time-consuming, but it would overwhelm us completely. Ethical action is only possible 
because certain norms have become a “second nature” for us (Hua XXVII: 37).  
 Whereas critical questioning, as mentioned before, is a modern achievement (which 
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has certain roots in Greek antiquity), Husserl finds a particularly developed form of the 
habitualization of norms in religious culture. The “level of religious culture” and the “level of 
scientific culture” shall now be sketched briefly. Husserl maintains that we find in every 
“higher developed culture” a cultural form of “religion” (Hua XXVII: 60).xix Within religions, 
certain laws have the status of absolute norms, i.e., norms that are valid not just factually, 
under the regimen of a certain ruler or during a certain era, but norms that we experience as 
unconditionally valid. The legislators of these absolute norms are transcendent powers which 
in a given religion count as divinities. A religion hence contains a system of absolute 
validities. As long as the dominance of religion remains intact, normal life coincides with 
religious life (Hua XXVII: 61). Husserl summarizes the experience of the religious life in the 
following, laconic remark: “There cannot be a tension [here] between authority and freedom, 
just as little as the dreamer has an awareness of illusion; it exactly presupposes awakening ” 
(ibid.). 
 Although religion teaches us about the existence of unconditional ought-to’s and 
about the habitualization of norms, and although such life is originally consistent in itself, 
enabling peaceful co-existence, an awakening is inevitable. This is partly a consequence of 
the fact that religious cultures have been and are mostly hierarchical; Husserl mentions 
explicitly the “imperialistic” community of priests in the middle ages (Hua XXVII: 90). 
Without assessing this Husserlian claim here, some indicative evidence for this hierarchy can 
be found in the way church authority is structured. A hierarchical culture inevitably exhibits 
the character of restriction rather than freedom (Hua XXVII: 63). It is hence opposed to our 
ethical abilities, to our abilities of critically taking position, which are equivalent to our 
freedom. Hence a religious movement for freedom evolves out of religion by necessity. It is 
remarkable and noteworthy that Husserl focuses on the movement of critique which emerges 
from religion itself, i.e., on immanent critique, rather than turning toward external critique 
imposed by philosophy and the sciences. He states that the religious movement for freedom 
and other similar movements cross over and play together, yet that the self-critique of 
religion and its internal transformation is a separate process (Hua XXVII: 67). The emphasis 
he places on this fact confirms again that Husserl acknowledges the significance of religion 
and, in a broader sense, the habitualization of norms. 
This level is countered by the level of scientific culture, the “level of a cultural 
humanity which forms itself and its environment through pure autonomous reason and, 
specifically, through scientific reason” (Hua XXVII: 73). Although philosophy and science 
were originally instituted in ancient Greece, the institution of an ethics on the basis of “pure 
autonomous reason” only happens in Kant’s philosophy. Kant thus plays an important, 
though not always unequivocal role in the Kaizo articles. Husserl repeatedly refers to the 
categorical imperative which has validity for all humans in such a way that we can only be 
“true” humans if we submit ourselves and our actions to the categorical imperative. 
Nevertheless, Husserl does not want to “take over the Kantian formulation and the Kantian 
explanation, in short, the Kantian theory; just this one thing shall be said, namely, that the 
individual human being lives a life which, not lived away in an arbitrary fashion, has a value” 
11 
Accepted Draft (please refer to Hegel Bulletin for final version) 
 
(Hua XXVII: 44). Despite repeated references to Kant, Husserl diverges from the Kantian 
ethics on a point of utmost significance: for Husserl, an ethical action does not mean a 
spontaneous new beginning. In the context of Husserl’s philosophy, an ethical unconditional 
beginning is impossible already due to the fact that the intentional basic structure of 
expectation and fulfillment or disappointment permeates all areas of life. 
During the modern era, religion and philosophy necessarily diverge. This does not 
mean that faith as such and its content are dismissed; yet the predominance of autonomous 
reason means that nothing can be accepted as unquestioned, merely on the basis of church 
authority (Hua XXVII: 92). In this way, the modern era is immediately opposed to the Middle 
Ages. The dominance of religion in the Middle Ages led to such a degree of dogmatism and 
imperialism that modernity had to intervene, as it were. In the process, the advantages and 
strong sides of premodern culture were neglected or drowned in the reformation movements. 
According to Husserl, modern philosophy differs from ancient philosophy particularly in the 
fact that it submits all traditional sciences to a radical critique of reason which only 
mathematics can ultimately stand up to (Hua XXVII: 92).  
As Husserl emphasizes the advantages as well as the downsides of religious culture, 
he alerts us that its insights should not be rejected prematurely. One such insight consist in 
the habitualization of norms. The modern tendency of individualization, i.e., the tendency to 
underscore the capacities of conscience and reason in the acting person is thus countered by 
the old European tradition of communal norms. In what way premodern insights can be 
integrated into or mediated with the modern concept of an autonomy of reason is 
unfortunately not explicitly spelled out by Husserl. However, he provides two important 
hints. First, Husserl talks of the primordial institution (Urstiftung) of an ethical life which all 
humans have to undertake for themselves as they reflect and make the decision to lead an 
ethical life, submitting themselves to unconditional ought-to’s (Hua XXVII: 43). This 
primordial institution is then taken up into the habitualization of the critical attitude such that 
a “habitual critical position-taking” is formed (Hua XXVII: 63). The decision to live and act 
critically thus does not always have to be repeated anew.  
 Second, norms can take on “the character of an available possession and good (…) for 
the single individual, but also for the community” (Hua XXVII: 75). The rational justification 
of a norm has to be possible in principle, but will not necessarily be carried out before a norm 
is actually applied; for the norm is part of an “available possession.” Yet in order for the 
norm to become such an available possession, different people need to confirm the norm’s 
rationality over a period of time, and the person which applies the norm should justify it in 
the mode of potentiality, although not in actuality. 
Does Husserl thus provide a standard that enables us to determine certain normative 
laws? All justification of specific laws, so he says, is “part of the development of an 
individual ethics itself, not of the outline of its principle guidelines” (Hua XXVII: 43). This is 
a consequence of Husserl’s intentions in these articles which also eliminates the impasses and 
pitfalls involved in working out an ethical theory. It is not Husserl’s intention to develop a 
complete ethical theory or take position in the controversial discussion of such theories. 
12 
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However, Husserl envisions certain tasks for philosophers as the “representatives of 
the spirit of reason or the spiritual organ through which the community reaches an awareness 
of its true determination (its true self)” (Hua XXVII: 54). Philosophers are exemplary, as it 
were, in leading a critical life of self-reflection. It is their task to perceive crises and to 
critically reflect on them. How is the philosopher supposed to recognize a crisis? Husserl 
implies that a crisis makes itself known and will be discerned by the philosophers if they are 
attentive to their community. A crisis can be recognized through certain moods in the 
consciousness of a community, such as a fundamental, existential discontent. It can thus be 
concluded from Husserl’s reflections on ethics that philosophers have to be attentive to 
communal moods, and that they have to stay in touch with the community rather than taking 
a detached position. These realizations have implications for the relation between natural and 
philosophical consciousness to be discussed in the concluding section of this essay. 
 
V. Concluding, or Writing about the World we Live in 
It has emerged from these considerations that ethics happens between conscience and norms, 
freedom and facticity, or the individual and their world. Furthermore, this is not a relationship 
of opposition, but penetration and interdependence. Although both elements can be found in 
both philosophers, Husserl can be said to “radicalise” or “deconstruct” Hegel because he 
keeps the main insights about norms in the wider sense and how they tie our homeworld 
together, but emphasises how norms can be changed in light of a crisis. Actual logos and 
dialectics as they happen between humans in political, legal, moral, and economic 
negotiations can fail, can lead to crisis. Hence the task of the phenomenologist: to observe the 
sense, the atmosphere of a cultural world. But how to recognise such an atmosphere? Even 
when the world is crisis, it can be difficult to discern – and even more so, what that crisis 
actually consists in. What if it is not crisis but, say, boredom, stagnation or some kind of 
hidden deterioration on account of a forgetfulness that, by way of being a forgetfulness, is 
likely to only become apparent when it is at least partially over? 
 One way to reveal cultural worlds, so Heidegger suggests, is the work of art. But this 
basic idea is already in Hegel, which is why Heidegger engages in some detail with Hegel’s 
claim that art is in its highest form is a thing of the past.xx This means that art would no 
longer be an appropriate revealing of world. But what is the character of a world that no 
longer lends itself to artistic revelation? Would it not be a world about which we by definition 
have to be worried because there seems to be some essential forgetfulness and concealment 
that resists the disclosure through art? In any case, let us turn to our best option, as it were: 
art. More precisely, literature, partly because we can only close on one example and partly 
because literature, by way of its intimate relation to language, might play a special role if we 
keep in mind that language is the element of Spirit as well as the essence of the homeworld. 
 German contemporary writer Judith Hermann undertakes this task with respect to 
several cultural worlds in her first book Summerhouse, Later, a collection of short stories. 
The atmospheres of several cultural worlds are captured from the perspective of a traveller of 
German origin, a stranger’s view. The perspective of the stranger, so we learn from Plato to 
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Husserl, is revealing because it accomplishes a kind of epoché, suspending the familiar. 
Whether it is New York and the strange local custom of people living in hotels as 
experienced in ‘Hunter Thomson Blues’ or the Russian solitary landscape narrated from the 
female contemplative perspective, the intensity of the Bali beach or the Icelandic silence of 
the outside world in contrast with sociality of the interior space – the perspective taken 
proves revealing and draws us in, given that we are also coming to these worlds as the 
stranger. Yet for Hermann, interpersonal relations between the characters are in the 
foreground, and in her next book, Nothing but Ghosts, cultural worlds no longer play a 
crucial role. 
The writer who arguably reveals the contemporary American world best is David 
Foster Wallace, as far as its atmosphere is concerned. Yet he does so perhaps not so much by 
literature as rather through a new genre that we would like to call ‘phenomenological 
ethnography’.xxi The style (taken in the wide, phenomenological sense) or indeed genre of 
phenomenological ethnography is exhibited at its best and clearest in the volume On a 
Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never do Again. The descriptions which are given sometimes as 
ethnography, sometimes as auto-ethnography have a phenomenological extension in that they 
reveal structures of our existence and especially structures of our interactions with others. Yet 
even more so, they reveal cultural worlds. Sometimes, this happens in footnotes, which 
generally add multidimensionality, density and humour to the work: Footnote 53: “[…] 
Tibor, table 64’s beloved and extremely cool Hungarian waiter […] whose pink and birdlike 
face on occasions like this expressed a combination of mortification and dignity that seem 
somehow to sum up the whole plight of postwar Eastern Europe” (Wallace 1998: 296). 
The atmosphere of the contemporary American world, for Wallace, is a world of easy 
and often infantile pleasures to which people are drawn because they have neither learned to 
stretch themselves through good literature, nor have they learned to say ‘no’ to the wrong 
pleasures or to a general excess of pleasures, especially where TV as well as internet 
activities are concerned. Wallace wonders whether there will be even more trouble for the 
state of the American cultural subject in the future when internet pornography comes to 
involve tactile as well as visual elements. Certain cultural moods or atmospheres make people 
yearn for passive, infantile pleasures, Wallace maintains. We might feel reminded of 
Heidegger’s notion of deep boredom, for example, which he does not take to the cultural 
level, unlike terror (Schrecken) which designates our world for Heidegger. 
Wallace states in an interview that he is a writer because he remembers such good 
experiences of having been a reader, and what was most “fun” about being a reader was 
“being part of some kind of exchange between consciousnesses”.xxii In other words, it was the 
sense of being part of Spirit, or the revelation of a shared cultural world. Because a revelation 
of our home or ethnos is always also a revelation of ethos, and thus matters to who we are. 
The task of the writer can then be, as Wallace puts it, “to mimic how the world feels against 
our nerve-endings right now”.xxiii   
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i Evaluating Hegel’s and Husserl’s criticism of Kant’s philosophy will not be possible within the 
framework of the current article. For some of the most important moments of such criticism, see 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, especially the chapter “Reason as lawgiver”, and Husserl’s Crisis, 
especially sections 28 to 32.  
ii Hegel explains this necessity in the Introduction to his Phenomenology of Spirit, sections 77 to 80. 
Without being able to explore the dialectical method in detail here, it should be noted that the 
combination of finding the appropriate starting point and proceeding by following internal tensions 
and contradictions until they have been overcome guarantees the internal necessity of the progression. 
iii Abbreviations used: 
Works by GWF Hegel: 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986). Werke in 20 volumes. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 
Enc III = Vol. 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III. (Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Transl. W. 
Wallace. Together with the Zusätze in Boumann’s Text (1845) transl. by A.V. Miller. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971) 
PhR = Vol. 7: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. (Elements of the Philosophy of Right. 
Transl. H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 
PhS = Vol. 3: Phänomenologie des Geistes. (Phenomenology of Spirit. Transl. A.V. Miller, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 
Works by E. Husserl: 
Hua XXVII =  Husserl, E. (1989), Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937). Husserliana Collected 
Works, vol. XXVII, ed. T. Nenon and H.-R. Sepp. Kluwer: The Hague. 
iv “The present time has ridden itself of its barbaric nature and unlawful willfulness, and the truth has 
ridden itself of its beyond and its contingent violence, such that the truthful reconciliation has become 
objective and helps unfold the state into the image and actuality of reason “ (PhR: § 360) – According 
to the Philosophy of Right, the German state accomplishes the reconciliation of subjectivity and 
objectivity; it is determined by “free and happy Sittlichkeit“ (PhR: § 356). The Roman empire is 
characterized by the diremption or split of Sittlichkeit into the extremes of private self-consciousness 
and abstract universality (PhR: § 357) which has to be sublated in the German state. – Concerning the 
problems with this position which leaves out those states in which no rational concept of freedom has 
been realized yet, see Siep 1982: 92. 
v A different topic which cannot be treated here concerns the question as to whether religion exhibits 
some structural similarity with the more developed shape of Sittlichkeit and whether the religious 
community is similar to the sittliche community. 
vi Within the part on Sittlichkeit, there is a further distinction between the family which represents the 
immediate shape of Sittlichkeit, civil society as a shape of diremption which contains elements of 
morality, and the state as fully developed Sittlichkeit. 
vii Ludwig Siep shows how the sublation of morality into Sittlichkeit means still giving a certain right 
to morality on the level of Sittlichkeit: Siep (1982). Siep describes the position of Sittlichkeit in Hegel 
well: “The confidence that the private and public realization of myself is overall secured in an 
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autonomous legal, social, and cultural state must not be confused with a blind trust in any kind of state 
authority, law or even order.” (Siep 1982: 92). 
viii We cannot examine here to what extent this criticism does justice to Kant’s philosophy. However, 
Hegel’s objections are rather extrinsic, so one might suspect that a response from a Kantian 
perspective could be formulated. The basic objection concerning an emptiness of content and the 
subjectivity of morality comes closer to the core of Kant’s theory. 
ix Conscience bears certain similarities with sense-certainty. Certainly, we are now concerned with an 
entirely different, more advanced level; we are concerned with Spirit whereas sense-certainty relates 
to the individual. Yet the failure of sense-certainty to preserve its standpoint has essentially been 
connected to the fact that we are always in a community and conversation with others.  
 Another connection between sense-certainty and conscience lies in the character of beginning 
which both of them exhibit. Sense-certainty forms the beginning of the journey of consciousness, and 
conscience forms the beginning of ethics, as it were. Hegel does not treat conscience at the very 
beginning of his reflections on Sittlichkeit and morality; but if we disregard the exact order of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit for a moment, the phenomenon of conscience proves to be an ‘earlier’ 
phenomenon. For example, natural consciousness frequently turns to it for explanation. Hegel’s 
analysis of conscience reveals – just like his analysis of sense-certainty – that there are no 
unconditional beginnings and that the allegedly unconditional claim of conscience does not occur out 
from nowhere. 
 At the beginning of the chapter on Spirit, we were already concerned with a law that is or 
exists – yet as a law pregiven to consciousness which consciousness had to accept. After the 
experience of the alienation of Spirit in Bildung and enlightenment, we are concerned with a law 
which bases its existence on the certainty of the inner world. Hegel makes reference to sense-certainty 
implicitly by using familiar formulations and explicitly in a comparison at the beginning of the 
analysis of conscience (PhS: 467/385). H.S. Harris points out that in the moral world, we are 
concerned with actions as “things” – with multiple aspects of actions, etc. –, whereas conscience 
returns to the beginning (Harris 1997: 460). Furthermore, Harris compares the standpoint of 
conscience with the moral sense philosophy developed by Shaftesbury and others: action is grounded 
in a moral sentiment. 
x H.S. Harris poses the question whether this shape has to be passed through by necessity or whether it 
might be possible to reach the level of reconciliation directly (Harris 1997: 457). To my mind, 
modified and softened versions of the “beautiful soul” are conceivable. 
xi Harris 1997: 502. 
xii The “Introduction” of Husserliana Volume XXVII (in which the Kaizo articles are published) 
informs us that the editor of the Japanese journal The Kaizo asked Husserl for a contribution. Husserl 
responded to this request since it gave him the opportunity to tackle a theme which had occupied him 
since the end of the war: the theme of “renewal,” which is the translation of “Kaizo.” Only the first 
three articles were actually published, as tensions with the publisher arose (Hua XXVII: x ff.) 
xiii An English translation of the Kaizo articles is currently being prepared. 
xiv Welton 1991. 
xv Ullrich Melle describes the articles as providing an “incomplete and one-sided picture of Husserl’s 
later ethical thought” since the theme of love is almost absent (Melle 2004: 346). It seems 
dissatisfying to describe those articles on ethics which Husserl himself prepared and released for 
publication as one-sided. At the same time, a more encompassing interpretation of Husserl’s ethics 
which also considers the topic of love as it emerges particularly in his lecture courses would move 
him into even closer proximity to (the early) Hegel. 
xvi Heidegger designates death as the possibility of absolute impossibility (1998: 250). 
xvii See Manuscript E III 4, “Teleologie,” p. 12a: “Absolute goals (…) are those goals which I need to 
follow in order to be able to love myself.” (Absolute Ziele (...) sind so, daß ich mich nur lieben kann, 
wenn ich ihnen folge.) I would like to thank Rudolf Bernet, Director of the Husserl Archives at the 
time of my accessing the manuscript, for his permission to quote from this manuscript. 
xviii The first two Kaizo articles belong to static phenomenology whereas the third article, as Husserl 
himself announces, employs a genetic analysis. See also Welton 1991: 586. 
xix We will leave open the question why Husserl only speaks of “higher developed cultures.” This 
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restriction might be based on a restriction in his concept of religion which would presuppose the 
existence of a fully formulated doctrine. 
xx Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975: 10. We will not be able to engage with the various interpretations of this Hegelian claim since it 
is the general idea, present in Hegel and Heidegger, that interests us here. 
xxi There is not really space to spell out what that means, in this article. It will soon be developed in 
an online project at the University of [removed for blind review]. 
xxii May 1996 Interview with Charlie Rose. 
xxiii 1996 Interview with WPR on Infinite Jest. 
